Introduction
Since the implementation of the reform and opening-up policy in 1978, China has been attracting foreign direct investment (FDI) from the rest of the world and has become one of the world's major FDI destinations. In the past two decades, however, a new trend has emerged: a dramatic increase in China's outward FDI (OFDI), especially since the introduction in 1999 of a national policy of encouraging domestic investment to "go out" of China (see Table 1 ). In 2011, China was the world's 6th largest source of FDI. Along with the impressive growth of overseas investment, a fair amount of literature has emerged explaining the determinants of China's OFDI at country (e.g. Liu et al., 2005; Buckley et al., 2007; Cheng & Ma, 2007; Cheung & Qian, 2009; Wei & Alon, 2010; Tolentino, 2010; Kolstad & Wigg, 2012) , industry-(e.g. Amighini et al., 2011) and firm level (e.g. Amighini et al., 2012; Wang et al., 2012) . A summary of these studies is presented in Table 2 .
Compared with previous analyses, our study attempts to investigate drivers of China's overseas investment from a fresh angle -China's regional OFDI. According to the Ministry of Commerce of China (MoCC), there are two groups of outward investors in China. The first group includes large central firms which are directly supervised and managed by the State Council, while the second group includes regional firms that are owned by regional governments and the private sector. Although started off with little investment, in the past decade, regional OFDI investors have grown into significant players in China's overseas market. For instance, in 2011, about half of the top 100 Chinese firms ranked by OFDI stock were regional firms 1 . More importantly, in terms of size, during 2003-2011, nearly a quarter of China's OFDI has been regional investment, with central investment making up the rest (see Table 1 ). Given the increasing importance of OFDI at regional level, it is surprising to find that no previous studies have attempted to specifically identify the drivers of China's regional OFDI.
In addition to the growing volume, what makes the issue of China's regional OFDI interesting is the enormous heterogeneity amongst the Chinese regions (see Figure 1 for a 1 State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council of China provides the names of centrally owned firms. The MoCC provides the top 100 Chinese firms ranked by OFDI Stock. By cross checking, we find that in 2011, of the top 100 firms, around 50 were regionally and 50 centrally owned firms. Regional firms include Huawei, Geely, Haier and TCL, which have made the headlines in international media for their overseas expansions.
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What drives China's outward FDI? A regional analysis map of China) 2 . The heterogeneity is not only reflected in the levels of income (measured by gross regional product per capita for instance), but also in many other aspects of the economic development, such as the scale of the international trade, cost of labour, level of educational attainment, etc 3 . Geographic heterogeneity is also noticeable across Chinese regions. For instance, some are located in the eastern coastal area while others are located in the interior. In the past decade, there there have also been significant dynamics related to regional OFDI. Based on data provided by MoCC, over the years, we observe a more balanced distribution of OFDI among regions, although the eastern regions still constitute the leading OFDI source. Such dynamics and heterogeneity across Chinese regions would have been disguised in a country-level analysis.
Furthermore, a regional analysis can provide policy implications at both central and local levels. An important characteristic of regional investors distinguishing them from central investors is that they are affected not only by national policies, but also by regional ones.
This is particularly true for China since regional governments need to comply with central policies but also need to adjust to local situations, in order to ensure strong regional economic growth. Hence both regional and central policies should be investigated to understand regional investors' decisions, and doing so should provide valuable information for both central and local governments to design strategies for facilitating China's overall international expansion.
Thus, given its growing importance, the heterogeneity across Chinese regions, and the possibly important policy implications here for both central and local governments, a study dedicated specifically to China's regional OFDI is warranted.
As the first study to examine the determinants of China's OFDI at regional level, our study further contributes to the literature in the following three important ways. First, although many previous analyses investigate China's OFDI from a host-country perspective, only a handful of studies explore the role of home-country factors at national level (e.g. Liu et al., 2005; Wei & Alon, 2010; Tolentino, 2010; Buckley et al., 2007 4 ). However, it is the home-country factors that decision makers can directly influence. The first three studies 2 Figure 1 shows that there are 31 regions in China, which include twenty 2 provinces, 5 Autonomous Regions and 4 Municipalities. For simplicity, we also refer to all of these as Chinese regions in the rest of the paper. 3 For instance, in 2011, international trade (exports plus imports) of Guangdong province alone reached 1006.8 billion US Dollar (USD), exceeding a quarter of China's total international trade that year, while that of Qinghai province was merely 0.8 billion USD. 4 At firm level, a recent study Wang et al. (2012) also explores driving factors of Chinese firms' OFDI.
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BOFIT Discussion Papers 16/ 2015 mentioned above focus mainly on macroeconomic factors, but their results may provide limited implications due to the constraint of short time series data (a maximum of 25 observations based on limited data availability). Buckley et al. (2007) include one home-country policy variable (policy liberalisation measured by a dummy variable), and two home country macroeconomic variables (exports and imports). To circumvent the issues of limited number of observations and to offer directly employable information to both regional and central policy makers, our study employs panel regional level data and focuses on home-country factors.
Second, previous studies on China's OFDI are largely focused on a single theoretical perspective (see Table 2 ). In her extensive review of theoretical FDI models, Faeth (2009) finds that different theories do not necessarily replace each other but may explain different aspects of the same phenomenon; hence she suggests that FDI should not be explained by single theories but more broadly by a combination of them. Buckley et al. (2007) and Wang et al. (2012) have already done so for China (see Table 2 ). In our study, we propose a comprehensive multi-level theoretical framework to investigate home drivers of 
Theoretical foundations
Studies that empirically examine the determinants of China's OFDI have employed various theoretical models (see Table 2 ). These models include Dunning's (1981) Investment Development Path (IDP) theory (e.g., Liu et al., 2005; Wei & Alon, 2010) , general multinational firm theory, namely market-seeking, resource-seeking and strategic asset-seeking motives (e.g., Amighini et al., 2011 Amighini et al., , 2012 Buckley et al., 2007; Cheng & Ma, 2007; Cheung & Qian, 2009) , and factor analysis where macroeconomic variables are introduced based on reviews of important determinants analysed in the previous literature (e.g., Kolstad & Wigg, 2012; Tolentino, 2010) . Two studies have combined several alternative theoretical models.
Using firm-level data, Wang et al. (2012) However, despite having successfully explained OFDI from many developed countries, the IDP theory has raised questions when it has been applied to developing and transitional economies. For instance, Svetličič (2003) suggest that "leapfrogging globals" in transitional economies may skip some of the stages described in the IDP theory. Kuada and Sorensen (2000) and Erdilek (2003) find that some developing countries are unable to carry out international activities, or they fail to develop localisation advantages despite moving through the economic development stages.
Thus, our study investigates whether for China, the world's largest developing economy, OFDI is consistent with the IDP theory or does it represent a major exception to it, especially given China's unique economic development path and the role played by its governments in the market-oriented economy. In particular, we consider whether China's economic development is captured solely by its GDP per capita, as suggested by the original IDP theory, or by a range of factors that reflect other aspects of the development of the Chinese economy.
Home locational constraints
Economic reforms and liberalisation -common features of developing and transitional economies -often lead to surges of OFDI as domestic firms, for the first time, are allowed to 6 The concepts of location and ownership advantage are derived from Dunning's "OLI" (or "eclectic") approach to the study of FDI (See, for example, Dunning (1977) ), where multinational firms' decisions on investing abroad are explained by ownership (O) advantage, if these firms possess superior technological knowledge or management skills (developed in home markets), localisation (L) advantage, if the host markets have non-transferable characteristics such as cheaper labour and abundant natural resources, or internalisation (I) advantage, if these firms consider it to be in their interest to exploit imperfections in external markets.
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What drives China's outward FDI? A regional analysis escape rigid home market constraints and to invest abroad. In the presence of this phenomenon, referred to as 'leapfrogging' (Svetličič, 2003) , OFDI from developing and transitional economies is not driven by ownership advantages associated with economic development but instead by home localisation disadvantages (Svetličič, 2003) .
According to UNCTAD (2006) 
Policy incentives
In a recent literature review by Faeth (2009) , policy incentives were found to form an important category of theoretical models that explain firms' overseas investment decisions 8 .
Specifically, governments can influence the firm's choice between domestic production, licensing or FDI, the firm's location choice, the firm's choice to stay or expand, etc. Indeed, Developing economies often feature significant government involvement in business affairs despite the emergence of a market system. For instance, Le & Zak (2006) find that policy uncertainty is an important driver of capital outflows from developing countries.
Correspondingly, home government policy is regarded as an essential part of an action plan for investment in less developed countries proposed by UNCTAD (2011). In terms of China, apart from the dominant central government, regional governments are gaining more autonomy in the process of reform and liberalisation. They need to comply with central guideline policies but are also keen to extend their local influence in order to promote rapid economic growth in their own regions. Therefore, we expect both central and local governments to have a profound impact on Chinese regional OFDI.
It is worth mentioning that many studies have analysed the role of host government policies in the host country in determining the location of FDI (see Assunção et al. (2011) and Faeth (2009) for reviews of recent literature in this strand), yet the impact of home policy factors on OFDI has not been extensively studied 9 . For China, only a few policy variables (e.g., liberalisation policy in 1992 in Buckley et al. (2007) , interest rate policy and exchange rate policy in Wei & Alon (2010) and Tolentino (2010) , government support in certain industries in Wang et al. (2011) ) have been employed in previous analyses as home determinants of China's OFDI. In our study, we not only examine a wide range of central polices, but also introduce important local government policies, to form a third explanation for China's regional OFDI. Gallup et al. (1999) In the original IDP theory, the level of economic development is explicitly measured by GDP per capita (see for instance Buckley & Castro (1998) , Dunning et al. (2001) and Kalotay (2004) ). Many researchers have raised the point that GDP per capita alone may not be sufficient capture all aspects of economic development of a country, and many additional economic elements have been proposed (e.g., Dunning, 1986 Dunning, , 1988 Narula, 1996; Dunning & Narula, 1996; Durán & Ubeda, 2001) . As summarised by Dunning & Narula (1996) , each country is different and hence the way that FDI activity and economic development interact is unique to each individual country. other firms, other industries, as well as from the availability of skilled labour force (Venables, 1996) . Previous OFDI from a home country can create positive externalities, such as factories and production lines that have already been set up, and hence it encourages further OFDI flows. As pointed out by Krugman (1997) , FDI tends to follow previous investment.
Geographic factors
Cheung & Qian (2009) 
Regional locational constraints
As mentioned earlier, we examine three types of locational constraints on the home economy: market and trade conditions (e.g., limited home market), costs of production (e.g., rising cost of labour), and local business conditions (e.g., competition from foreign firms). To our knowledge, none of these home locational constraints has been empirically examined as important home determinants of China's OFDI at national or regional level.
In terms of a limited home market, UNCTAD (2003) suggests that insufficient domestic consumption, coupled with excess industrial productive capacity since the late 1990s in certain industries (especially in machinery and electronic appliances), have encouraged Chinese firms to look for overseas markets. Regarding cost of labour, in recent decades, it has been increasing at a fast pace 11 as China has started to "catch up" with developed countries and the Chinese population has begun to age. For home business conditions, competition from foreign firms in the home economy is widely seen as an important driver behind China's rapid increase in OFDI (e.g., Nolan, 2001; Jürgens & Rehbehn, 2006) , especially
given that many foreign firms in China are export oriented.
In addition to competition from foreign enterprises, inadequate infrastructure is also a form of adverse business conditions at home that may push domestic investment abroad 
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China is above that of most other developing countries but is still well below that of developed economies 12 . Similarly, pollution is another form of adverse business condition for
Chinese firms, especially given that it has led to gradually tightening environmental regulations 13 . As suggested by the pollution haven hypothesis (Pethig, 1976; Yohe, 1979) , the production of pollution intensive goods will migrate from countries with high environmental standards to ones with low standards.
Hypothesis 2: the level of China's regional OFDI is positively related to (a) cost of labour, (b) foreign competition, (c) pollution; and negatively related to (d) domestic consumption 14 , (e) infrastructure.
Policy incentives of Chinese regions
As mentioned as the profitability of investments (Grubaugh, 1987) and hence has a direct negative impact on OFDI. A stronger home currency encourages OFDI, as it lowers the capital requirements of the investment (Aliber, 1970) . Since the most recent foreign exchange reform in 2005, the Chinese Yuan (CNY) has appreciated against the USD by over 24% (from 8.27 to 6.33 CNY/USD in 2011), which has had a positive influence on China's OFDI.
In addition to the above two central polices in monetary and foreign exchange areas, and to better account for the role of both central and local governments, we also include five new central government policies: credit growth, corporate taxation, anti-corruption, work-ers' rights, presence of State Owned Enterprises (SOEs), and two regional government policies (willingness to approve regional OFDI, and investment in research and development (R&D)).
Besides the interest rate, the Chinese central bank also relies heavily on direct administrative limits on loan growth as part of their monetary policy (International Monetary Fund, 2011) . The central bank would outline a yearly limit on loans that Chinese banks can extend to their customers. Each region is then unevenly allocated a loan quota and the sum of regional quotas should meet the national limit. Such credit growth has direct implications for the availability of financing for firms that wish to expand internationally. Despite the fact that OFDI is widely encouraged in China, one undesired impact of OFDI is that it may cause unemployment at home, as investment abroad may replace home country production and exports (Lipsey, 2004) . In recent years, in light of high domestic unemployment, some countries have adopted policies that restrict OFDI and attract investments back home 16 . At the same time, in China, local governments have gained increasing power over approving regional OFDI in the past decade 17 . Given the recent slowing of exports and economic growth in China, unemployment would have become a natural concern of local governments, making them reluctant to approve regional OFDI.
R&D capabilities are crucial for firms to expand abroad, as the ability of a firm to absorb external technology depends on its own prior R&D efforts (Kafouros & Buckley, 2008) . In China, regional investment in R&D is largely obtained from local government budgets, making local governments' support of R&D an important policy variable that directly affects how successful local firms' overseas expansion can be. Porter (1990) argues that advantages gained in clusters can form the foundation for successful internationalisation. These advantages go beyond those due to the co-presence of related firms and institutions (e.g. transportation links and climate) (Swann et al., 1998) to further include labour market pooling, the emergence of specialised input suppliers, and technological and knowledge spillovers (Gupta and Subramanian, 2008) . Chinese coastal regions should benefit from being located in a highly clustered environment and hence are more likely to be home to successful international expansion compared with inland regions.
From a home country perspective, there is also huge heterogeneity in the amount of natural resources in each region across China. In resource rich regions, a larger proportion of firms should be serving regional resource industry and be less pressured to expand abroad than those in regions with little national resource endowment. the posterior model probability can be used to assess the degree of support for .
The BAMLE approach of Moral-Benito (2012) extends the BMA methodology mentioned above to a panel data framework and employs averaging maximum likelihood estimates in a Bayesian spirit. In other words, the posterior probability in the standard BMA method can be rewritten as:
(1) while the BAMLE approach specifies the posterior probability as:
where � is the maximum likelihood estimate for in model .
In a panel data context, for a given model , the estimated econometric model consists of the following equation:
and two assumptions: As for the assumptions, ̅ is the time-series mean of for individual ( ̅ = (1⁄ ) ∑ =1 ). The first assumption indicates that the strict assumption of exogeneity of the lagged dependent variable is relaxed (i.e. it is allowed that current shocks affect future values of the dependent variable as implied by the dynamics of the model). This is the key assumption to obtain fixed T, large N consistent estimates of the autoregressive parameter α in Equation ( ).
Empirical results
Our sample period is 2003-2011. We use annual data for 30 Chinese regions (see Figure 1) .
Tibet is excluded due to data limitations. Variable measurement and data sources are discussed in Appendix A. Note that our study is at regional level, hence we employ regional data when measuring the central government policies (i.e. we look at regional implications of these central policies). Bank of Finland
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The descriptive statistics and correlation matrix are presented in Table 3 . Note that geographic variables are time invariant dummies and hence are not included. All correlation coefficients are below 0.8. Table 3 suggests that there is generally no cause for concern about correlations amongst determinants.
Single models
Prior to employing the BAMLE method to explicitly address the model uncertainty issue, as a comparison, we first present in Table 4 some single model estimates using the classical panel regressions for (1) the extended IDP theory, (2) home locational constraints, and (3) government incentives. Note that since the geographic variables do not vary over time, they
are not included in our experimentations at this stage. As shown in Table 2 , regression analysis is the most commonly adopted method in the existing literature on OFDI for China.
Hence we also employ panel regression analysis for the above three models. However, in the case of (1) the extended IDP theory, the agglomeration effects is captured by lagged regional OFDI. The presence of a lagged dependent variable would yield seriously biased estimates. Using ordinary least squares (OLS) would bias the coefficient of the lagged term upwards whereas using fixed effects would cause a downward bias in the aforementioned.
In addition, the estimates would also be biased because the unobserved country specific effects may be correlated with the regressors. Thus, to overcome the above mentioned problems, for the estimation of model (1) the extended IDP theory, we additionally employ the system GMM (two-step) estimator developed by Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1988) and present the results as (1b) alongside the panel regression results (1a) in Table 4 .
Looking at Table 4 , for (1) the extended IDP theory, (2) home locational constraints, and (3) government incentives, the corresponding significant determinants of China's regional OFDI are (1) agglomeration effects, human capital, and technology capability, (2) cost of labour, pollution, infrastructure, and (3) willingness to approve OFDI, respectively.
Note that in the case of (1) the extended IDP theory, we prefer the results based on the system GMM method (Equations (1b)) over that based on the panel regression method (Equation (1a)) 20 .
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What drives China's outward FDI? A regional analysis Table 4 suggest that all three alternative theories, i.e., (1) the extended IDP theory, (2) home locational constraints, and (3) government incentives, have explanatory power for the phenomenon of China's regional OFDI. Should we choose one of the models, or should we conclude that all determinants from all the models are robust? Since the theories or models do not provide guidance to choose between them and they are often compatible, the typical issue of module uncertainty arises here. If we choose one of the models, it would be an arbitrary choice, ignoring factors from alternative models that may have similar or stronger explanatory power. On the other hand, if we include all significant factors, it is unsystematic and more importantly, it imposes a risky assumption that the same factors would remain robust when competing models are also considered in an all-inclusive equation. Given that China's regional OFDI is a multi-faceted issue, it is essential to investigate alternative theoretical explanations to better understand the drivers behind it. Then the most feasible option is to explicitly address the issue of model uncertainty. Therefore, next, we move on to the prime empirical exercise of our paper, applying the BAMLE method to our data.
Results in

BAMLE results
Recall Equation (3) above:
To be more specific, , the dependent variable, is the regional OFDI to Gross Regional Product (GRP) ratio. Vector includes the extended IDP theory variables, home locational constraints and government incentives, and vector includes the time-invariant geographic factors. Note that the lagged dependent variable −1 , i.e. OFDI/GRP(-1), measures one of the extended IDP theory factors, namely the agglomeration effect. Moreover, since the BAMLE can accommodate variables without time variation , we are able to include the correlation tests suggest that there are first-order serial correlations, which is often expected, but no evidence of second-order serial correlation in the differenced error terms. We also report the difference in the Hansen test to check the exogeneity of each sub-set of instruments, which again does not reject the null of the joint validity of all the instruments. 21 In BAMLE method, the lagged dependent variable (in our case the agglomerate effect) is incorporated in all models, i.e., its posterior inclusion probability is one. We adopt this setting given the overwhelming evidence for the agglomeration effect for OFDI from China (e.g., Cheung & Qian, 2009 ) and from other countries (see Faeth (2009) for a review). The posterior mean for the agglomerate effect has the expected positive sign. The posterior standard deviation is much smaller than the mean (the latter divided by the former is 4.148 when m=5 and 4.087 when m=7). These confirm that it is a robust determinant. 22 When interpreting the PIPs in Table 5 , an alternative rule of thumb proposed by Jeffreys (1961) and refined by Kass & Raftery (1995) to judge the effectiveness of a regressor in explaining OFDI is that, the effect of a regressor is weak, positive, strong, or decisive if the PIPs lie between 50-75%, 75%-95%, 95%-99% or are greater than 99%, respectively. We thus set the prior inclusion probability to random and re-run the BAMLE tests using one million loops. Robust variables based on this alternative rule include two government policy variables (presence of SOEs (positive), willingness to approve OFDI (decisive)) and two extended IDP theory variables (trade openness (positive), agglomeration effect (decisive)). In our study, we follow the Bayesian robust check rule of the BAMLE method in Moral-Benito (2012), i.e., the PIPs (h) being higher than the prior inclusion probabilities (ξ) (h > ξ), especially since the alternative rule does not generate results that are very different from the general conclusions of our paper.
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What drives China's outward FDI? A regional analysis A comparison between Table 5 and Table 4 highlights the following issues. First, results in Table 4 suggest a total of seven significant home determinants of China's regional OFDI based on the three alternative models, while the BAMLE method suggests one fewer, i.e., a total of six variables. Second and more importantly, while the GMM and regression methods suggest three significant variables each for the extended IDP and home locational constraint models and only one for the government incentives model, the BAMLE results in Table 5 highlight the importance of government incentives (three robust variables) in explaining China's regional OFDI compared with the former two models (two and one significant variables respectively). In addition, overall, the robust variables in Table 5 are rather different from those suggested by Table 4 . The above comparison first confirms that, given that significant variables are found in all models, irrespective of whether the model uncertainty issue is addressed (in Table 5 ) or not (in Table 4 Thus, the comparison shows that the impact of model uncertainty on China's regional OFDI estimates is substantial and that employing the BAMLE method is necessary.
We now explain in detail our results in Table 5 . Looking at Table 5 , we first notice that GRP per capita does not appear to be a robust determinant of China's regional OFDI. This is in contrast to the prediction of the original IDP hypothesis, which is widely observed in previous studies. It is also in contrast to Liu et al. (2005) more on the activity carried out by governments. Our results suggest this is the case for China's regional OFDI 23 .
We now investigate our prime interest, the government policy variables. All three robust policy variables have the expected signs, confirming our predictions set out in Section 3. It is interesting to notice that both regional government policies, namely willingness to approve OFDI and investment in R&D, are robust. In contrast, only one central government policy, namely presence of SOEs, turns out to be a robust determinant. Our results suggest that both central and local governments have a strong influence on China's regional OFDI.
More importantly, our results especially highlight the irreplaceable role of local governments.
On the other hand, six other policy variables, all of which are set by the central government, turn out to have little influence on China's regional OFDI. It is interesting to observe that monetary policy, measured by the real base annual lending rate and credit growth set by the Chinese central bank, does not affect regional firms' decisions on whether to invest abroad. In China's bank-based financial system, in parallel with formal banking institutions, there is a flourishing informal financial market. The increasing demand for credit among China's private enterprises seems to be neglected by the former and hence the latter contributes to closing the gap (Tanaka & Molnar, 2008) . A thriving informal banking sector has notably weakened the link between monetary policy and the cost and availability of regional firms' financing.
In terms of home locational constraints, we find that pollution is a robust determinant of China OFDI, but with a positive sign. As pointed out by Chow (2008) , although the central government recognises the use of penalties, specific laws are yet to be passed in areas such as listing detailed polluting activities, estimating the negative externalities, and specifying suitable penalties for violations. Another major hindrance to environmental law enforcement is the lack of cooperation from regional governments, which are more interested in increasing regional output than in controlling pollution. Both imply that local firms could be paying much lower penalties than the environmental damage they cause. Assuming that environmental costs must reach a threshold level before they trigger an outflow of FDI (Manderson & Kneller, 2012) , before the threshold is reached, firms may be inclined to stay in China rather than to expand abroad. We find domestic consumption and labour cost are not 23 Note that even when we employ single model estimates for the extended IDP theory for China's OFDI at regional level (Equations (1a) and (1b) in Table 4 ), GRP per capita turns out to be an insignificant determinant.
What drives China's outward FDI? A regional analysis robust determinants. This implies that Chinese firms are not taking investment abroad as an exit strategy based on insufficient domestic demand. Despite rapidly increasing labour costs, the relative cost of labour may still be low enough to attract firms to stay in China. Our results also indicate that Chinese regional investors do not invest abroad in order to escape foreign competition or poor infrastructure in China.
Turning to the extended IDP theory, only two economic variables, namely trade openness and the agglomeration effect, are found to be robust. It seems that the other four factors have little influence on OFDI at regional level. For instance, while inward FDI concentrates on manufacturing industry in China, regional OFDI flows to other industries. Also, despite greater availability of FX reserves at local level, financial institutions that channel reserves to international firms may remain underdeveloped. Technological capability and human capital stock not being robust may suggest that regional overseas investors do not tend to invest in high technology sectors. Note that GRP per capital not being a robust determinant has been discussed above.
Both geographic factors have high PIPs, but their posterior standard deviations are higher than the posterior means. It implies these two variables are associated with OFDI, but we are not able to confirm in which direction. The same conclusion is reached when = 5 and = 7. We originally expect geographic location to be an important determinant. However, our empirical results suggest otherwise. Given the shifting of OFDI sources from eastern to inner and western regions, such results may reflect an overall more balanced distribution of OFDI across the regions of China in recent decade.
To sum up, the BAMLE results first confirm the explanatory power of all the proposed theories (except the geographic factors) in our study. The importance of government policy variables, namely presence of SOEs, willingness to approve local OFDI and investment in R&D, are particularly highlighted. The fact that two of the three polices variables are at local level shows that local governments significantly influence regional OFDI. Our study does not support the original IDP theory. In other words, China's OFDI, at least at regional level, is not the result of economic development as measured solely by GRP per capita. Our results are not sensitive to the choice of prior mean model size. Overall, our results first confirm the importance of the extended IDP theory, home locational constraints and government policies in determining China's regional OFDI. At the same time, it also shows that none of these aspects alone has full explanatory power.
Thus, our results demonstrate the necessity of employing a framework that combines several theories to better understand the drivers of China's regional OFDI. Second, our findings highlight the importance of government policy variables, namely the presence of SOEs, willingness to approve local OFDI, and investment in R&D. More importantly, we find local government policies (such as the latter two policies above) have notable influence on regional OFDI. This suggests that the rising importance of the local governments should not be overlooked, especially on issues of regional dimension. Third, although previous studies may suggest that OFDI will be automatically promoted by economic development in transitional or developing economies (e.g. Liu et al. (2005) ), our study clearly indicates that, at least at regional level, China's overseas investment is not due solely to economic as development measured by GRP per capita. Rather, our study emphasises the vital role of government policies, both at regional and central levels, in determining China's regional OFDI.
Fourth, robust variables based on the extended IDP theory include trade openness and agglomeration effect, but pollution is the only home locational constraint that is robust. Fifth, geographic factors have little impact on regional OFDI. Our results are not sensitive to the choice of prior mean model size.
Our study provides important implications for policy makers at both the central and local levels. OFDI promoting policies have largely been designed at the central level. Central
What drives China's outward FDI? A regional analysis policy makers need to recognise the heterogeneity of regional economies and that local investment may respond to a different set of factors compared with central investment abroad.
It is important to take these differences into account when setting OFDI policies, especially
given that about a quarter of China's OFDI originates at local level. For instance, while granting lower interest rates on loans to facilitate OFDI may boost overseas investment from centrally-owned enterprises, it may have little impact on investment decisions of local firms as their financing mainly depends on informal financial markets. In order to effectively encourage foreign investment at local level, policy makers need to employ measures that can lower the interest rates in the informal financial markets rather than at the large state owned banks.
As for the regional level, our study provides direct reference on the tools that local government can employ to support firms' overseas investment, such as more investment in R&D, approving OFDI projects based on their merits rather than local economic growth and unemployment rates, and directing a certain amount of resources away from SOEs. In addition, local authorities can also help encourage foreign trade, price pollution properly, and actively penalise polluters. It is equally important that both levels of governments cooperate. Note: There are thirty one regions in China, which include twenty two provinces (Anhui, Fujian, Gansu, Guangdong, Guizhou, Hainan, Hebei, Heilongjiang, Henan, Hubei, Hunan, Jiangsu, Jiangxi, Jilin, Liaoning, Qinghai, Shaanxi, Shandong, Shanxi, Sichuan, Yunnan, Zhejiang) , five Autonomous Regions (Guangxi , Inner Mongolia, Ningxia, Tibet, Xinjiang) and four Municipalities (Beijing, Chongqing, Shanghai, Tianjin). In our study we include all these regions except Tibet due to data limitations. Moral-Benito (2012) , the Bayesian robustness check adopted in the BAMLE approach is the PIPs (ℎ) being higher than the prior inclusion probabilities ( ), i.e., ℎ > . Based on Equation (4), in our study is 0.217 when = 5 and 0.304 when = 7 ( = 23). . All data are at regional level (note that the annual base interest rate set by the central bank and the nominal exchange of CNY/USD are national level data before they were adjusted by regional CPI to obtain the regional real terms). All variables are in natural logarithm except the cost of labour and interest rate.
